Paths to Global Social Regulation – What Can Americans Learn from the European Union by Compa, Lance A & Turner, Lowell
Cornell University ILR School
DigitalCommons@ILR
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection
2003
Paths to Global Social Regulation – What Can
Americans Learn from the European Union
Lance A. Compa
Cornell University, lac24@cornell.edu
Lowell Turner
Cornell University, lrt4@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles
Part of the International and Comparative Labor Relations Commons, and the Unions
Commons
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR.
Support this valuable resource today!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles
and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Paths to Global Social Regulation – What Can Americans Learn from the
European Union
Abstract
[Excerpt] For American proponents of global justice, social Europe appears distant yet inspirational, with all
its weaknesses still a "vanguard" model for the social regulation of the global economy. We believe that a great
deal can be learned by other countries, regions and the global economy as a whole from the ongoing
experience of European economic and social integration. We also believe, however, that American experiences
with NAFTA as well as with contemporary labor movement revitalization and coalition building offer positive
lessons for Europeans and other actors in the global North and South.
As much as we admire the European model, therefore, we also believe that (1) there is room for mutual
learning, and (2) lessons can be learned but models cannot be transferred without significant adaptation. The
road to a social America or social global economy lies not in adoption of the European model but rather in the
politics of contestation. Just as the limited EU social dimension is possible only because European unions and
governments have fought for it, a stronger social order for the global economy as well as regionally in the
Americas will only come with pressure from revitalized interest groups and social movements.
Keywords
Europe, social integration, labor movement, revitalization, social partnership, industrial relations
Disciplines
International and Comparative Labor Relations | Unions
Comments
Suggested Citation
Compa, L. & Turner, L. (2003). Paths to global social regulation – What can Americans learn from the
European Union [Electronic version]. In R. Hoffmann, O. Jacobi, B. Keller, and M. Weiss (Eds.), European
integration as a social experiment in a globalized world (pp 149-159). Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
Required Publisher’s Statement
© Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/759
Lance Compa and Lowell Turner 
PATHS TO GLOBAL SOCIAL 
REGULATION - WHAT CAN 
AMERICANS LEARN FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION? 
For American proponents of global justice, social Europe appears distant yet inspi-
rational, with all its weaknesses still a "vanguard" model for the social regulation of 
the global economy. We believe that a great deal can be learned by other coun-
tries, regions and the global economy as a whole from the ongoing experience of 
European economic and social integration. We also believe, however, that Ameri-
can experiences with NAFTA as well as with contemporary labor movement revi-
talization and coalition building offer positive lessons for Europeans and other 
actors in the global North and South. 
As much as we admire the European model, therefore, we also believe that (1) 
there is room for mutual learning, and (2) lessons can be learned but models 
cannot be transferred without significant adaptation. The road to a social America 
or social global economy lies not in adoption of the European model but rather in 
the politics of contestation. Just as the limited EU social dimension is possible only 
because European unions and governments have fought for it, a stronger social 
order for the global economy as well as regionally in the Americas will only come 
with pressure from revitalized interest groups and social movements. 
The current rise of social protest, from Seattle in 1999 to worldwide antiwar 
mobilizations in 2003, provides reason to hope that transformation forces are gath-
ering - forces that among other things can credibly demand stronger labor and 
social standards in the U.S., Europe and throughout the global economy. Labor 
unions and the coalitions for social and global justice in which they participate are 
the decisive actors in contemporary possibilities for social transformation. 
The currently hot "varieties of capitalism" literature makes important contribu-
tions to understanding cross-national differences in economic strategy, welfare 
state policy, and the contrasting capacities of governments, firms and unions (Hall 
and Soskice 2001). There is, however, a fatalistic bias toward the following conser-
vative orientation: if you have the institutions of a coordinated market economy 
(CME), especially one with strong unions, you are fortunate and can sustain strong 
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social policies and partnership at the national level, even against persistent cor-
porate attacks for "labor market rigidity"and excessive social benefits. For decades, 
the New York Times and the Washington Post have run yearly features predicting 
disaster for the German economy because workers are too protected (Landler 2003 
for the latest; entering "Germany" and "labor market rigidity" in the Lexis news 
database yields 475 citations in the U.S. press going back to the beginning of elec-
tronic news archives). 
At least a soft social dimension prevails in a Europe that happens to include 
several such CME's. If you don't have such institutions already in place, however, 
you are simply out of luck. This is the case for unions in the U.S., U.K. and other 
liberal market economies (LME's), heroically but also rather hopelessly pursuing 
greater influence in the political economy and at the workplace (Thelen 2001). We 
disagree: just as mutual learning is possible among social dimensions and their 
labor union proponents, so are modern labor and social movement mobilizations 
aimed at reforming institutions, from the U.K. and Italy to Brazil and the U.S. 
Comparing Strengths and Weaknesses 
If we look at American and European paths to global social regulation as a contest 
for which path is best for workers' rights, Europe wins. But strengths and weak-
nesses emerge in both systems. Our challenge is to learn from them and move 
toward a strengthened global labor rights regime. Our analysis can be summa-
rized as follows: 
1) The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its labor side agree-
ment are deeply flawed. 
2) In comparison, Europe's social dimension is robust. 
3) Not so fast. The EU's efforts at social regulation have flaws, too. The European 
social dimension is weakened both by the internal opposition of business and 
governments, and by the contradictions of vanguard social integration in a 
global economy. 
4) In any event, we cannot simply import the European model. Instead, Ameri-
cans can and should learn from Europe's experience, adapt the lessons to our 
own circumstances, and draw on our own strengths to recast social regulation 
- in the U.S., in our hemisphere, and in the global economy. 
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NAFTA Flaws 
The social dimension of North American economic integration is thin. NAFTA is pri-
marily a commercial agreement giving lucrative privileges to multinational firms, 
banks and investors. NAFTA negotiators assumed that free markets in trade and 
investment automatically bring more growth, development and jobs, with no need 
for consciously building social justice or sustainable development into the archi-
tecture of regional commerce. To take a single obvious example, NAFTA negotia-
tors refused to address labor migration in the agreement, in contrast to the ElTs 
freedom of movement for workers. 
After ten years, this "trickle-down" strategy has failed. NAFTA has had profound 
social effects, negative for many workers and positive for many elites. Many firms 
use NAFTA as a club to beat down wages and working conditions in all three coun-
tries. (Bronfenbrenner 2000). Mexican workers' real wages have declined overall, 
while Mexico's vulnerable agricultural sector is about to be devastated by the final 
phase-out of protections against the at once more efficient and highly subsidized 
agricultural exports from the United States. (Scott, Salas and Campbell 2001; Jordan 
and Sullivan 2003). Millions of migrant workers from Mexico continue to suffer low 
wages, poor conditions, and widespread discrimination in the United States 
(MALDEF and NELP 2003). 
NAFTA, in other words, is deeply flawed. This is so because American multina-
tional corporations have resisted any effective social dimension, from minimal 
labor and social standards to environmental protections, and the three NAFTA gov-
ernments bowed to their pressure. (Cameron andTomlin 2002, citing Mexican gov-
ernment officials scoffing at the labor side agreement). 
In the face of MNC dominance, labor and environmental movements in the 
three countries have not yet become strong enough, as a combined force, to 
demand a viable social dimension that would include such standards and protec-
tions. While we believe MNC and government perspectives are short-sighted, even 
for the medium and long-term interests of business, unions and their allies have 
not fully coalesced around a viable and persuasive alternative vision for regulation 
of the North American (not to mention global) economy. 
Rather than an integral social feature of the trade agreement, the North Amer-
ican Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) is a "side agreement" to NAFTA. 
Divorced from the agreement itself, the NAALC has no grounding in treaty law or 
other binding norms. 
The NAALC does not create supranational standards for treatment of workers. 
It does not trigger a dynamic of "upward harmonization" of labor standards. 
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Instead, the three parties to the agreement reserved sovereign power to set and 
to change labor standards. The countries committed themselves to "effective 
enforcement" of those national standards, whatever they are, not to trinational or 
international norms. 
The NAALC defines eleven "labor principles" covering rights to organize, to 
bargain, and to strike; elimination of forced labor, child labor, and discrimination; 
and guarantees of workplace health and safety, minimum wages, and migrant 
worker protection. Seen in the best light, these principles amount to an implicit 
"charter of rights"for workers in North America. But this "charter" is a statement of 
values, not a statement of law. Violations of NAALC principles do not give rise to 
enforceable action in national legal systems. 
The NAALC makes a peculiar division of its labor principles into three groups 
with different treatment. Freedom of association complaints can be taken up by 
ministerial consultations, but no more. Forced labor, discrimination and migrant 
worker cases can proceed to independent committees of experts empowered to 
make nonbonding recommendations, but no more. In three areas - child labor, 
workplace health and safety, and minimum wages - complaints over failure to 
enforce national laws can come to an arbitral panel that can fine the offending 
government. If the fine is not paid, the arbitral panel can impose trade sanctions 
against a violating company or sector of industry. 
The NAALC created no serious institutional role for what Europeans call the 
social partners, representatives of peak trade union and employer organizations. 
They hold seats on NAALC advisory boards that are largely inactive and receive 
invitations to NAALC conferences that have no follow-up in policymaking or imple-
mentation. 
On the trade union side, Mexican and Canadian labor movements hesitate to 
commit themselves to close collaboration with the AFL-CIO and U.S. unions. Mex-
icans remember an unsavory history of interventionism on behalf of U.S. govern-
ment foreign policy. Canadians recall a relatively conservative, business union 
approach to collective bargaining in the United States. Even the more progressive, 
solidaristic, social-unionist approach of the AFL-CIO under John Sweeney has not 
fully overcome Mexican and Canadian suspicions. 
Cross-border collective bargaining does not exist except in unusual contexts 
like professional sports.The once-unified U.S.and Canadian autoworkers union and 
its international collective agreements broke apart in the 1980s.The Inter-Ameri-
can Regional Workers Organization (ORIT),the regional equivalent to the ETUC,is 
a faction-ridden body so far incapable of having real influence in NAFTA or in hemi-
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spheric trade negotiations. Even if the ORIT were more cohesive, there is no NAFTA 
headquarters location akin to Brussels where ORIT could systematically intervene 
in NAFTA affairs. 
On the management side, there is no NAFTA definition of a "North Ameri-
can Company" with regional obligations. There are just national companies 
active on a multinational scale and guaranteed "national treatment" by the 
three governments, automatically benefiting larger, more powerful American 
multinationals. 
The NAALC created a forum where trade unions in the three countries could 
shape new forms of collaboration bringing complaints to the labor ministries of 
the three countries. Of some thirty cases, most have involved governments'failure 
to enforce laws protecting freedom of association. Other cases addressed discrim-
ination, migrant worker protection, workplace health and safety, and minimum 
wages. 
Presenting these complaints had the positive effect of promoting new forms of 
cross-border solidarity among unions and NGOs in the three countries. (Compa 
2001). However, the governments shrank from any real enforcement in these cases. 
Ministerial consultations led to conferences and research reports, but no dis-
cernible improvement in labor law enforcement. Despite several opportunities, the 
countries have never established an independent committee of experts or an arbi-
tral panel. This was as true of the Clinton and Zedillo administrations as it is now 
of the Bush and Fox administrations, and the Bush administration's Department of 
Labor has virtually shut down its application of the NAALC. 
EU Strengths 
Compare this glass-mostly-empty assessment of the North American model of 
social regulation in a regional economic arrangement to what appear to be, from 
our side of the Atlantic, a mostly full glass in the European model: 
• European integration is deeper and broader than North America's. NAFTA did 
not produce a North American commission, parliament, or court of justice; 
these features of the European Union create a strong institutional framework to 
address social issues. 
M The EU has carried out extensive programs of economic assistance to less-deve-
loped member states, especially benefiting Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
and soon to benefit the eastern accession countries. 
• The EU has adopted far-reaching social charters, most recently the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union accepted at the Nice summit in 
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December 2000, containing extensive statements of basic rights and protec-
tions for workers. 
• The EU is empowered to adopt supranational directives, including those on 
workers' rights and labor protections. Several member states have had to 
change national law to conform to EU labor directives.The prospect of the Uni-
ted States Congress changing national labor law in response to orders from a 
supranational authority is beyond comprehension. 
• The EU establishes a strong institutional role for the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) in which trade union and management groups are 
empowered to negotiate framework agreements on labor-related directives; 
and the EU is authorized to impose the terms of a directive if the social partners 
fail to reach agreement. 
H The European Works Council (EWC) directive creates cross-border relationships 
between trade unions at large European firms, launching new pressure toward 
transnational collective (or at least coordinated) bargaining. 
M The ETUC has a solid institutional (and physical) presence in Brussels to deal 
with the Commission and related bodies. As with any trade union grouping, 
divisions exist in the ETUC, but there is still a common mission to defend Euro-
pe's social welfare model against the U.S. free market model. 
All of the above are possible because European unions have been strong 
and influential at the national level in many countries, because they have been 
well anchored in institutions of social partnership (from tripartite forums to 
plant-level works councils), and because they have consistently but critically 
supported European integration and its social dimension (Martin and Ross 
1999;Turner 1996;Visser 1999). To make the argument in simplest terms, social 
Europe is more substantial than social America because on the whole European 
unions are stronger and more politically influential - and they have coalesced 
across national boundaries in critical support of economic integration, 
informed by at least a germinal vision of a social Europe (Dauderstadt 2001; 
Muckenberger 2001). 
Not So Fast 
Experts know that while the EU's social dimension is robust compared with that of 
North America, it has weaknesses. The Council still runs the European Union; the 
roles of the Commission, Parliament and Court are limited. Enlargement to the East 
will not bring the same levels of economic assistance to less developed countries 
as those granted to earlier new members. 
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c rights and protec- The Nice Charter is not an integral part of the treaty.The question is still unset-
tled whether it creates "law" that will be enforced by national courts or the ECJ,or 
whether it is just another statement of good intentions with no force behind it. 
(Bercusson 2002). Even where EU directives are binding, enforcement is often less 
than swift and tough; witness how many years it took France to obey a Court of 
Justice order to remove its national law prohibiting night work by women. 
Like the NAALC, the Treaty of Amsterdam creates three "tiers" of labor rights. 
Binding EU directives can be adopted by qualified majority support for some 
matters, which tend to be softer, less controversial ones like health and safety or 
information and consultation. Unanimity is required for harder issues,such as social 
security and termination of employment contracts, where that a single country can 
veto a directive.Three critical issues are totally "off the table:" pay, the right of asso-
ciation, and the right to strike and lock out. EU countries have reserved complete 
national sovereignty over these subjects. 
The ETUC has not succeeded in convincing UNICE, the counterpart employer 
organization, to engage fully in framework bargaining except in relatively easy 
cases like parental leave and part-time work, where they can agree on least-
common-denominator rules. Where the Commission steps in, it is often with 
watered-down directives solicitous of employer interests. At the end of the day -
and often by noon - free market values and interests trump social concerns in the 
EU system. 
European works councils have moved only haltingly toward a transnational bar-
gaining framework. For one thing, EWC's are only entitled to information and con-
sultation, not bargaining. Many European companies are happy to tell their EWC 
representatives how dire the competitive situation has become and why worker 
demands must be restrained. Some even use the EWC system to bypass trade 
unions and deal with councils dominated by office employees and midlevel man-
agers (HBS 2001). Many EWC annual meetings devolve into separate demands from 
national delegates that management keep jobs in their country. 
The ETUC is understaffed and underfunded (Turner 1996). National trade 
unions, employers and governments operating in deeply embedded national labor 
markets and collective bargaining frameworks, not cross-border bodies in a 
Europe-wide system, are still the major actors in European industrial relations. 
While the regional and international orientation of European unions is more devel-
oped than that of American unions (or unions in other parts of the world), national 
institutional focus thus continues to weaken what has been and can be accom-
plished at the European level (Visser 1999; Martin and Ross 1999). 
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Finding a Balance 
From a North American perspective, the strengths of the European social dimension 
still far outweigh the weaknesses, especially contrasted with NAFTA and the NAALC 
The next challenge for labor rights advocates in the United States comes with accel-
erating negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Right now, 
the trade union demand is to stop the FTAA. But some form of hemispheric economic 
integration plan will ultimately take shape. In this context, U.S. trade unionists and 
allies should aim at preserving and strengthening positive elements of the NAALC 
while overcoming its main flaws. Drawing lessons from the EU social dimension will 
greatly help this process. So will drawing on positive elements of Mercosur's Social-
Labor Declaration, a South American counterpart to the NAALC. 
The 2002 victory of Luis Inacio da Silva (Lula) of the Brazilian Workers' Party 
creates a new context with greater potential for progress on a social dimension in 
hemispheric integration. Brazil and its Mercosur partners agreed on a Social-Labor 
Declaration in 1999 with several elements that should go into a "mix" of social 
models, along with lessons from earlier North American and EU experiences. 
Among these are tripartite sectoral bodies taking up matters of concern to workers 
in trade-related industries. Applying this model to the hemispheric scale could 
trigger a North American model of cross-border engagement akin to that triggered 
by the EWC directive. 
Here are other examples of elements of a social dimension with positive fea-
tures from North American, European, and Southern Cone initiatives 
• Labor rights should be integral to a hemispheric trade accord, not a side agre-
ement. If Europe succeeds in integrating the Nice Charter into the Treaty, Ame-
ricans should demand no less. 
• The NAALC labor principles, perhaps enhanced by norms in the EU Charter and 
in Mercosur's Declaration not mentioned in the NAALC, such as information 
and consultation as a basic right of all workers, should become binding supra-
national standards like EU directives. 
• Any hemispheric social dimension should contain a vibrant complaint system 
backed up by sanctions against countries or companies that violate workers' 
rights. Unions should build their cross-border institutional structures to take 
advantage of complaint mechanisms, as with the ETUC and the Mercosur's 
trade union coordinating body. 
• Like the European Court of Justice, the Inter-American Commission and Court 
of Human Rights should be empowered to consider and remedy workers'rights 
violations. 
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H A strong institutional role like that of Europe's social partners and trade unions 
in Mercosur's tripartite bodies should be built into a social dimension of the 
Americas for trade unions and other civil society actors. 
H A well-funded permanent research and oversight body should take shape in 
any hemispheric trade and labor arrangement. Here the EU's European Indu-
strial Relations Observatory (EIRO) is a valuable model, producing extensive, 
important research on a continuing basis, using its own team of staff experts 
and contracting widely with experts around Europe. Similarly, though it is still 
on the drawing board, Mercosur envisions a social-labor Observatorio to moni-
tor developments and produce reports and analyses on workers'rights in mem-
ber countries. 
What You See Is What You Get 
Ultimately, the gains in labor and social standards incorporated into a future plan 
for hemispheric integration will depend on the revitalization, coalition building 
and political influence of unions, working together, in North and South America 
alike. With Lula in power in Brazil, with labor and environmental groups continu-
ing to mobilize around trade agreements, even after the defeat on "trade promo-
tion authority" (fast track by a new name), there are conceivable openings for a 
social dimension in the Americas. 
The U.S.-Jordan trade agreement, for example, negotiated in the waning 
months of the Clinton administration, included the AFL-CIO and Sierra Club in 
policy-making processes and yielded meaningful labor and environmental stan-
dards (and enforcement mechanisms) in this small but example-setting agree-
ment. The Jordan agreement created a template for future linkages of trade and 
workers' rights. (Polaski 2003). 
While the European social model cannot be transplanted to the United States, 
to NAFTA, or to a new hemispheric trade regime, underlying values and lessons can 
inform American efforts. The EU shows what is possible in today's global economy, 
and it is inspiring to see that European unions are convinced they can make more 
gains in the future. For American unions, in a liberal market economy that provides 
only weak institutional protections for labor, the essential element in the promo-
tion of a social dimension - for North America, for the hemisphere and for the 
global economy - is greatly expanded future political power. And such power is 
possible only through labor movement revitalization and the broadest coalition 
efforts, local, national, regional and global. 
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